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ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes an organizational and operational 
model for developing Partner Nation Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) in failed states and under-governed spaces.  
The Partner Nation SOF would be designed to improve and 
expand sovereignty throughout the country.  Accordingly, the 
model organization would provide the basic functions of 
governance while supporting the development of social 
capital and national civic identity.  To achieve this, this 
thesis also proposes a Security Force Assistance framework 
for U.S. forces to develop the Partner Nation program.  
Within this framework, United States involvement would be 
reduced to the minimum; advisors would guide and direct the 
Partner Nation in the development and employment of their 
SOF.  The thesis uses the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) as a potential Partner Nation; specific 
recommendations are made for application of this model to 
the DRC.  Finally, some suggestions are made about adapting 
this model to other failed states and under-governed areas. 
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The United States Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, 
has suggested that in the foreseeable future the U.S. 
military “will only be as good as the effectiveness, 
credibility, and sustainability of its local partners.”1  He 
then notes that, while the U.S. military has improved its 
focus on developing an advisory capacity, U.S. foreign 
assistance requires a unified effort from both the 
Department of Defense and the Department of State.  
Secretary Gates further describes his proposal to pool funds 
from both Departments to facilitate U.S. interagency foreign 
assistance programs in failed states.2  However, as 
important as the whole-of-government debate may be within 
Washington, it still misses the point in much of the 
developing world. 
Furthermore, even as U.S. counterinsurgency efforts are 
finally returning to Edward Lansdale’s concepts of advising 
and shaping local forces to fend for themselves, U.S. 
development programs continue to focus on U.S.-centric 
outputs.3  In Closing the Sovereignty Gap, Ashraf Ghani 
suggests that current United States and international aid 
programs suffer from four systemic problems: (1) they create 
parallel government structures, (2) there is a lack of 
harmonization between programs, (3) non-state provision of 
basic services undermines state legitimacy, and (4) aid 
                     
1  Robert Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," Foreign Affairs 
89, no. 3 (May/June 2010): 2–6, 2. 
2  Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves,” 2. 
3  Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1972). 
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programs provide unpredictable support.4  In both U.S. 
counterinsurgency operations and development projects, the 
stated objective is to build partner nation capacity.5  The 
fact that these two distinct activities have a similar goal 
suggests that there may also be a singular way to achieve 
greater effectiveness.  This thesis will argue that, indeed, 
greater effectiveness can be achieved by reducing direct 
U.S. involvement and increasing U.S. advisory (not training) 
activities focused on teaching Partner Nations to teach 
themselves. 
Very few developing nations are enthusiastic about 
inviting U.S. government agencies to conduct direct 
activities in their country, as evidenced by the rather cool 
response of African nations to United States Africa 
Command.6  Moreover, the division of authority and labor 
between security forces, law enforcement, and government 
entities in failed states, does not mirror what we are used 
to in the developed world.  This mismatch is one reason that 
this thesis argues for a Partner Nation Special Operations 
Force (SOF) that is designed to provide the basic functions 
of governance where the state has very limited penetration.   
The model presented in this thesis shifts the focus 
from the form of government, and “proper” divisions of 
power, to the functions of sovereignty—security, economics, 
                     
4  Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, Closing the 
Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building (London: Overseas 
Development Institute, 2005), 10. 
5  Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," 3. 
6  Dennis Penn, "Africa Command and the Militarization of U.S. 
Foreign Policy," in Short of General War: Perspectives on the Use of 
Military Power in the 21st Century, ed. Harry Yarger, 39–55 (Carlisle: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 40. 
 3
governance, and justice.  More importantly, U.S. personnel 
would not directly participate in providing these services.  
The security improvements and development projects outlined 
here are to be conducted and sustained solely by Partner 
Nation forces.  U.S. Special Operations Forces’ role, 
instead, is to assist in building the Partner Nation’s 
capacity.  To those ends, this thesis concentrates on how 
such forces would be configured, trained, and advised in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The Democratic Republic 
of the Congo represents a particularly challenging test 
case.  It is so large and broken that no current “whole-of-
government” approach could possibly work.  Instead, it begs 
a significantly different design, but one that could 
potentially then be adopted for other failed states. 
 4
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II. FRAMING THE PROBLEM—THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
THE CONGO 
A. WHY FAILED STATES MATTER 
Failed states and under-governed spaces are typically 
only considered strategically important to the United States 
if an identifiable security threat, such as a Violent 
Extremist Organization (VEO), is present or operating in 
that area.  Accordingly, much attention has been given to 
the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy’s (NSS) suggestion 
that failed states and under-governed territories are likely 
havens for terrorists and VEOs.7  In response, the current 
Special Operations Command-Africa (SOCAFRICA) strategy is 
specifically designed to develop Partner Nation capabilities 
to counter VEOs in Africa through the development of rapid-
strike forces with key Partner Nations, such as a Special 
Capabilities Battalion in Kisangani, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC).8 
However, the focus on identifiable, current threats in 
Africa, and in failed states in general, may not 
sufficiently justify commitment of U.S. troops and 
resources.  For example, political scientist Aiden Hehir 
suggests that the supposed link between failed states and 
international terrorism was developed by supporters of the 
global war on terrorism (GWOT) in order to justify 
                     
7  National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington, 2006), 15. 
8  Special Operations Command-Africa, SOCAFRICA Strategic Overview 
(Stuttgart, 2009). 
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increasing intervention in international politics.9  Hehir 
goes on to argue that of the African nations listed in the 
top 20 failed states of the Foreign Policy 2006 Failed 
States Index, only Sudan and Somalia were known to have any 
recognized Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) from the 
2005 list, and that was al Qaeda.10  
This leads to at least two problems with the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s current focus on international 
terrorism and VEOs.  On one hand, the demand to respond to 
perceived and potential VEOs and terrorists requires that 
the United States and its allies undertake an expensive and 
involved program to develop a local Counterterrorism (CT) 
capability.  On the other hand, for those who would prefer 
to focus on the absence of identified VEOs and FTOs, this 
assumes that the situation in under-governed areas will not 
change faster than the U.S. can react.  Both points of view 
rely on a best-case scenario that (a) a U.S.-resourced CT 
development program would be successful, and (b) the Partner 
Nation would properly employ and sustain a new CT capability 
once the U.S. helped build it.  Clearly, however, the U.S. 
cannot count on either of these.  
Rather than orienting ourselves to only be able to 
counter known threats, eliminating the conditions that 
support VEOs may better suit U.S. and Partner Nation needs 
for a variety of reasons.  For instance, a less-quoted 
section of the 2006 NSS recognizes that development and 
security are essential to countering future threats in 
                     
9  Aidan Hehir, "The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: 
A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom," Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 1, no. 3 (2007): 307–332, 307. 
10  Hehir, “Myth of the Failed State,” 312. 
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under-governed areas.11  The argument is that the strategic 
importance of a failed state can not be determined by its 
current significance (or lack thereof) alone. What also 
needs to be taken into account is that state’s potential 
future significance by the time it is better developed.  The 
assumption that states that are failing now will never 
improve, or never become threats, will only constrain U.S. 
options for helping assist a fragile state to become a 
Partner Nation later. 
Additionally, even those failed states that are not 
current threats can have a significant destabilizing impact 
on their neighbors and the region.12  This is particularly 
true of the DRC.  As Gerard Prunier amply demonstrates in 
Africa’s World War, the “softness” of Zaire in the 1990s 
created a situation whereby the problems of the surrounding 
nations could not be contained, but spilled into Zaire, 
mixed together, and nearly destabilized the entire 
continent.13  
B. SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES IN THE DRC 
One of the most complex problems facing failed states 
is gaining and maintaining sovereign authority and control 
over their territory.  In this respect, the DRC is no 
exception.  The initial conception of the DRC as a single 
country occurred not because most of its eventual 
inhabitants considered themselves to belong to a nation with 
a shared historic homeland, common myths, and historical 
                     
11  National Security Strategy (2006), 33. 
12  National Security Strategy (2006), 15. 
13  Gerard Prunier, Africa's World War (New York: Oxford Universtiy 
Press, 2009), 73. 
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memories, and a common economy bound together by common 
legal rights.14  Rather, the Congo territory was formed in 
1884 by the near obsessive colonial desires of Belgium’s 
King Leopold.15  Since then, the Congo has been plagued by 
both internal and external problems which have helped 
prevent it from developing de facto sovereignty. 
The sovereignty of the modern state is no longer 
determined solely by a state possessing a “monopol[y of] the 
legitimate use of physical force.”16 Along these lines, the 
World Bank has published several research reports entitled 
Governance Matters that seek to define and qualify “good 
governance.”  The eighth edition of this report, published 
in June 2009, lists six indicators of governance designed to 
measure the authority of the state. These include: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Instability and Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Burden, Rule of Law, 
and Control of Corruption.17  Likewise, Ashraf Ghani lists 
10 functions of the state that include many non-security 
aspects, such as investment in human capital and formation 
of markets.18  For her part, Heather Gregg distills four 
essential pillars of a functioning state, to include 
                     
14  Jack David Eller, Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An 
Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999), 17. 
15  Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1998), 44,78. 
16  Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," 1918, 
http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/weber.pdf (accessed April 
13, 2010). 
17  Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance 
Matters VIII (Washington: World Bank, 2009). 
18  Ghani, et al., Closing the Sovereignty Gap, 6. 
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security, economics, governance, and justice.19  In other 
words, while physical security may be a necessary first step 
to a functioning state, any program designed to extend and 
improve sovereignty in a failed state should also address 
these other aspects of good governance. 
1. Sub-National Issues 
A full exploration of the complex and inter-related 
difficulties plaguing the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
is beyond the scope of this thesis.  There are, however, at 
least two types of sub-national obstacles to sovereignty in 
the DRC that should be discussed in terms of their distinct 
impact on state function and governance.  One challenge is 
local tribal, demographic, and ethnic problems that have 
practically always existed in the Congo.  In many agrarian, 
poorly developed areas, like the Kivu provinces of the DRC, 
land is the source of wealth and power, and land belongs to 
the tribes.  So, for instance, if members of Tribe A want to 
expand their holdings, they must physically wrest the land 
away from Tribe B.20  The easiest way to do this is to 
attack the members of Tribe B. 
These pre-existing tribal and ethnic rivalries have 
been exploited by nearly every ruling power in the Congo.  
For instance, Belgian colonialists supported various 
internal rivalries in order to expand colonial control and 
increase the extraction and export of resources.21  Later, 
once independence was granted on 4 July 1960 and direct 
                     
19  Heather Gregg, "Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding 
Counterinsurgency," Parameters, Autumn 2009: 18–31, 21. 
20  Prunier, Africa's World War, 326. 
21  Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost, 124. 
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Belgian control was lifted, the internal rivalries that had 
been encouraged by the Belgians fractured the new nation 
with Katanga and Kasai provinces attempting to secede before 
the end of the first month.22  Perhaps the most damaging 
exploitation of ethnic rivalries occurred later still, 
during former President Mobutu’s rule. He was a master of 
manipulating political appointments based on ethnicity and 
making use of power brokers known as the “Big Vegetables.”23 
The second type of sub-national challenge grows out of 
the recent regional conflicts that preceded Joseph Kabila’s 
election to the presidency in 2006.  A multitude of “rebel” 
groups, such as the Mayi Mayi and the Ituri warlords that 
operate in the eastern provinces of the Congo, continue to 
cause problems.  During the conflict with Rwanda (officially 
from 1998 to 2003), these “rebel” groups operated in 
conjunction with the Forces Armees Congolaises (FAC), to 
varying degrees.24  As a result of their assistance to 
President Laurent-Desire Kabila (Joseph Kabila’s father), 
these groups received much better weapons than village 
security forces and remained better equipped and more 
heavily armed once the conflict formally ended.  Partly 
because the economy in east Congo is practically non-
existent, and partly because these “rebel” groups are so 
well armed, they now act like semi-autonomous raiding 
                     
22  Larry R. Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2007), 36. 
23  Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz (New York: 
Perennial, 2001), 97–103. 
24  Prunier, Africa's World War, 211. 
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parties, looting what they need to survive from the local 
villages before returning to the under-governed bush.25   
Another, more subtle and pervasive internal threat to 
sovereignty lies beyond the armed nature of ethnic and 
tribal rivalry.  This is the “take what I can to take care 
of myself” attitude that abounds in Congolese government 
offices from the national level down through the village 
level.  This concept was principally known during President 
Mobutu’s reign as Article 15, or “Je me debrouille,” which 
translates as “I manage for myself.”26  Years after Mobutu’s 
reign had ended, journalist Tim Butcher encountered the 
lingering effects of this attitude and subsequently 
describes how one must individually bribe Congolese 
officials in order to accomplish anything.27  Butcher also 
details one spectacular example of the crippling effect that 
this self-centered, what’s-in-it-for-me governance had on 
the attempt by one international aid organization to install 
new electrical generators in Kisangani.  Although the 
equipment had been purchased and was ready for installation, 
the project was derailed by the asinine bribe requirements 
of government officials to move the equipment through 
Matadi.28 
These sub-national, or internal, obstacles to decent, 
never mind good, governance are perpetuated, if not 
magnified, by the lack of infrastructure and state 
penetration that normally connect countries internally, and 
                     
25  Prunier, Africa's World War, 321. 
26  Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz, 151–153. 
27  Tim Butcher, Blood River (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 62. 
28  Butcher, Blood River, 287. 
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provide the markets and access necessary to make armed 
activity and looting less economically attractive.  While 
such an assessment may seem to simply point out the obvious, 
many current programs specifically claim they focus on 
targeting armed groups for either disarmament or 
neutralization in order to address these issues, but they do 
so without taking into account the underlying factors that 
contribute to the situation arising in the first place.29  
Here is where what Andrew Natsios describes for 
reconstruction and development could be applied to the 
Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process, 
especially since two of the activities he mentions are 
missing from most of U.S. Special Operations Command’s CT 
development programs: transferring technical skills to 
locals, and supporting local institutions.30  Consequently, 
I have made both integral to the program proposed in this 
thesis. 
2. Trans-National Issues 
The external challenges to effective sovereignty in the 
DRC are as varied and complex as the internal challenges.  
Likewise, external interference in the Congo can be divided 
into two broad categories: regional and international.  
Regional interference in this case refers to activities by 
other African countries.  International interference refers 
to actors outside Africa. 
 
                     
29  Prunier, Africa's World War, 308. 
30  Andrew Natsios, "Nine Principles of Reconstruction and 
Development," Parameters, Autumn 2005: 4–20. 
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Regional interference in the DRC from the fall of 
Mobutu’s regime has been extensively analyzed in Gerard 
Prunier’s book, Africa’s World War.  His analysis of the 
situation before the 2006 election of Joseph Kabila as 
president illustrates how difficult it is to cleanly 
separate regional interference from domestic divides in the 
Congo case.31  For example, the militaries of Uganda and 
Rwanda “donated” much of their artillery and heavy equipment 
to local proxies in the DRC as they disengaged and returned 
to their own countries in 2003.32  Hence, there are very 
few, if any, completely autonomous and non-aligned internal 
“rebel” groups within the Congo. 
Three regional “rebel” groups require specific mention: 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Ugandan Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF), and the Rwandan Forces 
Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR).  Each of these 
groups is active within the DRC primarily because Congolese 
territory offers a safe haven that does not exist in their 
“parent” country.  Hence, the primary objective of these 
groups is not to influence or control the Congo, but to 
influence or control their “parent” country.  This 
exemplifies the potential destabilizing effect of under-
governed space at the regional level. 
International interference in the Congo, while almost 
always framed as “assistance,” has both undermined and 
retarded the development of a stable, proficient Congolese 
government.  The original, horrific, example of this is King 
Leopold’s creation of the International Association of the 
                     
31  Prunier, Africa's World War, 320–325. 
32  Prunier, Africa's World War, 293. 
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Congo in 1879 to “found a chain of posts or hospices” in 
Africa that opened the door to one of history’s most brutal 
colonial experiences.33 Later, when the Congo declared 
independence on July 4, 1960, the Cold War was in full swing 
and both sides immediately grappled for positioning through 
offers of military and economic aid.  Even the subtitle of 
Central Intelligence Agency Chief of Station Larry Devlin’s 
book, Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone, underscores the 
view of Africa as a proxy battlefield for fighting the 
Soviets.34   
The most recent iteration of international interference 
has been conducted with much loftier intentions and 
increased oversight, but without appreciably different 
results.35  The Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies 
en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC) is the largest 
United Nations (UN) mission ever assembled, with over 24,000 
personnel currently deployed to the DRC and continuous 
operations since 2001.36  To illustrate the ineffectiveness 
of the UN mission, Tim Butcher describes how MONUC personnel 
consider themselves, and are considered to be, visiting 
“another world.”37  In one particularly striking vignette, 
he describes a UN worker pointing to a crowd of 200 
Banyamulenge refugees camped outside the gate of the UN post 
in Kalemie.  They had come to the UN for protection, but 
                     
33  Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost, 66. 
34  Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo. 
35  Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz, 215. 
36  United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, MONUC Facts and Figures—United Nations Organization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, February 28, 2010, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml (accessed 
April 18, 2010). 
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were forced to remain outside the compound.38  This and 
other failures by MONUC to protect the local population have 
resulted in DRC government requests that UN forces leave the 
Congo by 2011.39  To make matters more complicated, it is 
not clear whether official Congolese statements condemning 
MONUC are not just another attempt to procure more aid from 
other international organizations, such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. 
C. SOCIAL CAPITAL ISSUES 
There are many definitions of social capital, but two 
definitions that are particularly relevant are from the U.S. 
Army Field Manual Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, and from the 
World Bank.  The U.S. Army describes social capital as “the 
power of individuals and groups to use social networks of 
reciprocity and exchange to accomplish their goals.”40  The 
World Bank provides additional detail by defining social 
capital to include “the institutions, relationships, and 
norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's 
social interactions.”41  The repeated exploitation of ethnic 
and tribal rivalries, meddling by neighboring states, and 
international interference have created an environment 
                     
37  Butcher, Blood River, 268. 
38  Butcher, Blood River, 89. 
39  Henri Boshoff, 23 Sep 2009: ISS Today: Is MONUC Withdrawal from 
the DRC by 2011 Realistic?, September 23, 2009, 
http://www.issafrica.org/pgcontent.php?UID=17441 (accessed April 18, 
2010). 
40  United States Army, Counterinsurgency (Washington: Department of 
the Army, 2006), 3–10. 
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marked by the lack of what Jennifer Widner suggests makes 
social capital work: trust.42  The problems created by a 
lack of trust lead to two kinds of damaged relationships.   
The first set of damaged relationships are those 
between local groups, and include inter-tribe and inter-
family relationships, as well as inter-ethnic relations.  
These relationships can be characterized by varying degrees 
of in-group/out-group rivalry.  Prunier describes this 
situation as the result of “instrumentalized tribalism.”43  
This kind of in-group/out-group rivalry and competition is 
also detailed in Michela Wrong’s account of President 
Mobutu’s distribution of government largesse and political 
appointments over the course of his 30-year reign.44  As 
Butcher notes, the effect of this constant rivalry has been 
that many Congolese now see no benefit in working to provide 
for themselves when they can simply wait and take what they 
need from someone else.45 
The second category of broken relationships are those 
between the government and the governed.  The negative 
impact of Mobutu’s Article 15 continues to permeate the 
political landscape of the Congo.46  An important secondary 
effect of widespread government corruption is that soldiers 
have often been the last to get paid, if they are paid at 
all.  Accordingly, many young men with weapons resort to 
                     
42  Jennifer A. Widner, "Building Effective Trust in the Aftermath of 
Severe Conflict," in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. 
Robert I. Rotberg, 222–236 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 222. 
43  Prunier, Africa's World War, 170. 
44  Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz, 102, 125, 175. 
45  Butcher, Blood River, 310. 
46  Prunier, Africa's World War, 318. 
 17
taking care of themselves.47  In this environment, even when 
national political reforms are made, the lack of state 
penetration into much of the national territory makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to ensure those reforms are 
reflected at the local level.48  The effect of this broken 
relationship is a severe mistrust of the government in 
general, and of the military in particular. 
D. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS PROBLEMS 
Years of regional conflict and state mismanagement have 
created considerable problems for civil-military relations 
in the DRC.  Prunier concludes his account about the 
continental conflict centered on the Congo by pointing out 
that a lack of security continues to be the primary problem.  
He also points out that the concepts of mixage (recruiting 
from multiple ethnicities) and brassage (employing soldiers 
away from their home villages) have not been employed in the 
Congo.49  Many former “rebels” become “integrated” into the 
FARDC, but then remain in the same location where they can 
all too easily resume their looting.  The Institute for 
Security Studies reports that the 12 rapid response 




                     
47  Prunier, Africa's World War, 171. 
48  Butcher, Blood River, 260, 269. 
49  Prunier, Africa's World War, 306. 
50  Boshoff, MONUC Withdrawal from the DRC. 
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Most accounts of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the 
DRC echo pessimistic reports by the Global Facilitation 
Network for SSR51 and the International Crisis Group.52  
Continued instances of indiscriminate violence and military 
brutality by soldiers against civilians have kept thousands 
of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from returning to 
their homes.  Likewise, concessions made to the CNDP in the 
2009 Peace Agreement provided amnesty to many perpetrators 
of the violence in eastern Congo.53  Common sense alone 
suggests that such circumstances require a program that will 
employ mixage and brassage, will help strengthen the image 
of the Congolese government, and will include mechanisms 
that ensure accountability to and by local authorities. 
 
                     
51  Vincenza Scherrer, Global Facilitation Network for Security 
Sector Reform, February 2008, 
http://www.ssrnetwork.net/ssrbulletin/dr_congo.php#dcaf (accessed April 
19, 2010). 
52  International Crisis Group, Conflict in Congo - International 
Crisis Group, June 16, 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-
issues/conflict-in-congo.aspx (accessed April 19, 2010). 
53  International Crisis Group, Conflict in Congo. 
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III. A SINGLE-ORGANIZATION MODEL FOR A WHOLE-OF-
GOVERNMENT APPROACH 
There are three primary obstacles to taking action 
against Violent Extremist Organizations in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo as described in the previous chapter.  
The first problem is the predominance of under-governed 
spaces throughout the country.  The second is the lack of 
social capital and trust, particularly of the military.  The 
last problem is the near-total deterioration of 
infrastructure except for a few pockets of development 
outside the cities of Kinshasa, Kisangani, and Matadi. 
Any security sector reform or development program that 
hopes to effectively prevent or counter the rise and 
proliferation of Violent Extremist Organizations and Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations in the Eastern Congo, or any other 
failed state, must address all of these primary problems.54  
Any attempt to focus on one problem area to the exclusion of 
the others will at best only yield short-term success, and 
may deepen the difficulties in the neglected areas.   
The model this thesis proposes for organizing and 
employing Partner Nation Special Operations Forces is 
designed to address these obstacles holistically.  My model, 
which draws on Colonel Eric Wendt’s and the oil-spot 
counterinsurgency models, addresses security, infrastructure 
construction and improvement, and support for the 
development of social capital. 
                     
54  A. J. Bacevich, James D. Hallums, Richard H. White and Thomas F. 
Young, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, 
Special Report, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (Washington: 
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), 11, 12. 
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A. INTRODUCTION TO THE MODELS 
1. Colonel Wendt’s Military Elements of 
Counterinsurgency Model 
In 2005, U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel Eric Wendt 
proposed an operational model for counterinsurgency in Iraq 
that included three military components.55  These three 
components are a constabulary force, a movement-to-contact 
force, and a quick reaction force, as shown in Figure 1.  In 
Colonel Wendt’s model, each of these components was composed 
of, or led by, U.S. forces operating in the country.56 
The constabulary force is the key operational element 
in Wendt’s model.  In counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, 
the focus of military activities is meant to shift from 
fighting the current insurgents to removing future 
insurgents’ base of operations, also know as population-
centric operations.  Since the insurgents rely on support 
from the population, the constabulary force is critical to 
removing or disrupting that support.57 
The constabulary force in COIN serves as the foundation 
for improving security via the provision of community 
security and the gathering of local intelligence.  According 
to Colonel Wendt, the constabulary force should be empowered 
to control both Human Intelligence (HUMINT) networks and 
Population Resource Control Measures (PRCM).  In his model, 
                     
55  Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," Special 
Warfare, September 2005: 1–13. 
56  Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 7. 
57  Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 7. 
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the constabulary force is ideally led by U.S. Special Forces 
who live in the area of responsibility.58 
The movement-to-contact force, meanwhile, provides 
security beyond the constabulary force’s area of 
responsibility.  By operating between the boundaries of 
local constabulary forces, the movement-to-contact force 
would deny insurgents a safe haven and staging area for 
future attacks.  According to Wendt’s model, the movement-
to-contact force must patrol continuously and aggressively 
to force the insurgents to either engage and fight, or move 
and flee.59  The movement-to-contact force requires more 
resources than the constabulary force, but fewer resources 
than the quick-reaction force.  In areas where the United 
States has a large number of forces deployed, such as 
Afghanistan, the movement-to-contact force should be 
composed of infantry or light armor units that combine 
significant firepower with mobility.60 
Finally, the quick-reaction force provides 
reinforcement and assistance when the threat is beyond the 
capacity of either the constabulary or movement-to-contact 
forces to efficiently neutralize.  The quick-reaction force 
requires more training and resources than the other elements 
in order to be successful.  For example, it must have 
constant communications, night fighting capability, and the 
mobility to respond quickly over distance.  U.S. Rangers, 
SEALs, or Marines are Colonel Wendt’s examples of quick-
reaction forces.61 
                     
58  Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 7. 
59  Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 7. 
60  Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 8. 
61  Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 7. 
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Figure 1.   WENDT MILITARY ELEMENTS OF COIN MODEL 
2. The Oil-Spot Counterinsurgency Model 
The oil-spot model for counterinsurgency was 
historically introduced by the French in Morocco and has 
since been incorporated in the latest U.S. COIN doctrine as 
clear-hold-build operations.62  Oil spot operations are 
designed to help develop a Partner Nation’s long-term 
security and governance capacity.63  An “oil spot” is 
created by focusing on individual communities and 
establishing a secure area within each community. 
                     
62  United States Army, "Tactics in Counterinsurgency," Field Manual 
3-24.2 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, April 2009), 3–18. 
63  United States Army, "Tactics in Counterinsurgency," 3–18. 
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According to this model, as the small secure areas 
mature and develop, the area to be secured can be enlarged.  
This model was employed by the Citizens Irregular Defense 
Group (CIDG) program to develop community security capacity 
in Vietnam.64  The CIDG example illustrates the concept of 
focusing on the security of local communities and empowering 
the community to provide its own security.  The idea is that 
as oil spots spread toward each other, insurgents will lose 
room in which to maneuver.  Once the oil spots begin to 
connect, the larger secured areas can expand faster and more 
easily through mutually supporting relationships. 
The oil spot approach to counterinsurgency has been 
made popular recently thanks to Major Gant’s article, “One 
Tribe at a Time.”65  Major Gant argues that community 
capability can be developed by empowering the tribal 
militias to provide for their own security against 
insurgents.66  As each village becomes capable of securing 
itself, the insurgents’ support base would shrink and 
eventually vanish, thereby ending the insurgency.  This is 
also the approach that Andrew Krepinevich recommended for 
Iraq.67  As Krepinevich has written, an oil-spot strategy 
should focus on securing the population in one location 
first before then expanding control into the rest of the 
country. 
                     
64  Thomas L. Ahern Jr., CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 53. 
65  Jim Gant, "One Tribe at a Time," Steven Pressfield Blog, 2009, 
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-
content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf (accessed 
January 20, 2010). 
66  Gant, "One Tribe at a Time," 10. 
67  Andrew Krepinevich, "How to Win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 
5 (September/October 2005): 87. 
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B. ADAPTATION AND APPLICATION OF MODELS TO THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 
Where the thesis proposal borrows from, but then 
deviates from, places both these models in its consideration 
of the overall mission or objective.  If the mission, or 
objective, of the new Partner Nation Special Operations 
Force is to prevent or counter Violent Extremist 
Organizations (VEOs), by addressing and alleviating the 
sovereignty problems described above, then the unit must be 
designed to operate without the direct leadership of U.S. 
soldiers.  It must also be capable of addressing more than 
the security aspects of insurgency and VEOs.  The unit must 
be designed to bring law and order to under-governed spaces, 
to act as the protector of the local population, and to 
effect noticeable improvements in the quality of life for 
locals through infrastructure development.   
What both Wendt’s and the oil spot models suggest for 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and for failed states 
in general, is the development of a highly proficient 
movement-to-contact force that is then employed in an oil 
spot fashion, as shown in Figure 2.  One difference between 
what Colonel Wendt’s model addresses and what working with 
Partner Nation forces requires, however, is that U.S. forces 
should only contribute in an advisory and training capacity; 
U.S. forces should not themselves conduct these missions in 
the DRC.  Therefore, the priority should be to modify the 
design of the Partner Nation SOF to match local needs using 
resources that are sustainable. 
Second, in the DRC, the movement-to-contact force needs 
to take precedence over the constabulary force, at least 
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initially.  This is because it is the movement-to-contact 
force that projects governance and sovereignty by providing 
the means by which the oil spot spreads.  With the support 
of a local movement-to-contact force, local administrators 
and government offices would have the freedom of action to 
begin community improvements without having to worry about 
being looted by roaming militias.  Roaming militias who 
attack from, and retreat back to, the safety of the under-
governed “bush” frequently overwhelm local constabulary 
forces.  A properly trained and employed movement-to-contact 
force would presumably deny roaming militias the safe haven 
of the bush. 
Each movement-to-contact element should be permanently 
assigned an area of responsibility, or set of oil spots, and 
these in turn need to be aligned with the existing local 
administrative structure.  This, too, represents a deviation 
from Colonel Wendt’s model in that the DRC movement-to-
contact forces would be tied to particular areas and would 
not operate independently from the local administration, or 
patrol from a separate military installation.  The aim would 
be for these movement-to-contact forces to expand zones of 
security in oil-spot fashion until individual communities 
can reinforce one another. 
A highly proficient movement-to-contact force could 
also assist with training local constabulary forces, and 
could reinforce them until they are sufficiently robust to 
operate on their own.  It should be remembered that 
development of the intelligence networks Wendt describes may 
be necessary to enable U.S. forces (or any foreign military) 
to accurately target and take action against insurgents 
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hidden among the locals.  However, local security forces do 
not face this dilemma; they presumably know exactly who the 
insurgents are, but simply lack the capacity to take action.  
This capacity to act would be provided by a proficient 
movement-to-contact force. 
By the same token, the quick-reaction force as 
described in Wendt’s model is less useful in regions where 
the threat is locally based and relatively small.  In the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, very few militia groups 
cooperate together for any length of time.  They also lack 
the individual mobility or motivation to overthrow the 
government.68  Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, 
few developing nations have the logistical capacity to 
employ a competent quick-reaction force.  Certainly, the DRC 
does not. 
Rather than developing a quick-reaction force, what 
this thesis proposes is the introduction of a civic action 
force—one designed to operate in conjunction with the 
movement-to-contact force.  One critique of the otherwise 
highly touted U.S. intervention in El Salvador is that civic 
action programs were not sufficiently funded or coordinated 
with the military security effort.69  What this thesis 
envisions, is a civic action force trained in basic 
infrastructure development (described in greater detail 
below) that would be capable of moving into secured areas 
behind the movement-to-contact force to help permanently 
expand the boundaries of the oil spots.  Such a civic action 
force would likewise work closely with the local 
                     
68  Butcher, Blood River, 260. 
69  Bacevich, et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars, 12. 
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administration to improve and develop community 
infrastructure and lines of communication. 
 
Figure 2.   KELLER PARTNER NATION SOF MODEL 
C. DEVELOPING A DISTRIBUTED CAPACITY FOR SOVEREIGNTY 
In his article “The New Rules of War,” John Arquilla 
outlines three maxims for future conflicts: (1) Many and 
small beats few and large, (2) Finding matters more than 
flanking, and (3) Swarming is the new surging.70  By 
extending Arquilla’s tenets beyond the security sector to 
governance as a whole, this helps describe what this new, 
proposed operational design for SOF in formerly failed/still 
broken states attempts to do.  By deploying movement-to-
contact and civic action forces in oil-spot fashion 
                     
70  John Arquilla, "The New Rules of War," Foreign Policy, no. 178 
(Mar/Apr 2010): 60–67. 
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throughout the state’s territory to conduct sovereignty 
operations, the Partner Nation SOF would develop the 
capacity for governance in under-governed areas.   
In order to employ what may be called “sovereignty 
operations,” it is helpful to examine how this Partner 
Nation SOF model would support good governance in failed 
states in slightly more detail.  For example, Andrew Natsios 
offers nine principles of reconstruction and development.  
These principles are: (1) local ownership, (2) local 
capacity building, (3) local sustainability, (4) project 
selectivity based on local requirements, (5) assessment in 
accordance with local conditions, (6) clearly defined 
results, (7) partnership with locals, (8) flexibility, and 
(9) accountability.71  Local involvement is mentioned in his 
descriptions for six of these principles, again suggesting 
that the distributed employment of the oil-spot method may 
be much more useful than a centralized SOF.  While the 
article in which he lists these principles is intended to 
inform U.S. foreign aid policy, Natsios’ advice for 
reconstruction and development could easily be adopted by 
SOF to serve as the conceptual framework around which to 
build the separate missions and activities of the movement-
to-contact and civic action forces outlined here. 
For example, because security operations would be the 
primary focus of the movement-to-contact units—which we will 
refer to as Rangers—reconnaissance and movement-to-contact 
patrols would be conducted continuously.  Under the 
objective of expanding security not just around the clock, 
but beyond the immediate vicinity, a critical supporting 
                     
71  Natsios, "Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development." 
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mission would be to coordinate link-up patrols with 
neighboring Ranger units in order to strengthen and expand 
the security network.  By developing this network, if a 
threat is identified that is too large for the Ranger unit 
assigned to one area to address, combined offensive 
operations could be conducted.  Among other things, this 
would demonstrate to rebels, insurgents, and criminals that 
they can no longer exploit the seams between local 
jurisdictions 
At the same time, it would be up to the Civic Action 
units to conduct activities to support economic and 
infrastructure improvement.  As will be explained in greater 
detail below, the primary missions of the various Civic 
Action sections (e.g., Agriculture and Construction) would 
develop, improve, and expand local markets along with access 
to those markets.  In some areas of the DRC, this might 
begin with the basics, such as improving farming techniques 
and dirt roads so that the local diet can include more than 
just protein-deficient cassava and cassava bread.72  With 
improved access to markets would come other economic 
developments, and eventually, ideally, a shift to vocational 
training, for instance.73 
Both the Ranger and Civic Action units would coordinate 
their actions to improve and expand governance and 
accountability.  The Rangers would improve governance by 
providing the security necessary for citizens to participate 
in community projects.  Likewise, the Civic Action unit 
                     
72  Butcher, Blood River, 169–171. 
73  The United States Institute of Peace, Guiding Principles for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2009), 9–158. 
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would support both governance and accountability by 
improving the basic infrastructure in the area and 
transferring the necessary skills to citizens who want to 
cooperate and participate.  Additionally, the services 
provided by the Medical/Sanitation Civic Action section 
(also described below) would significantly improve the 
quality of basic services.  Together, these types of 
operations would create a supportive environment that should 
impel local citizens to want to cooperate and participate in 
the administration of their area. 
Also, as it works with the local constabulary, the 
Ranger unit would exemplify the rule of law through its 
professional and ethical conduct on a daily basis.  
Presumably, too, it would provide local police with the 
skills and competence required to perform crime prevention 
duties without having to resort to illegitimate methods.  
While the Ranger unit would not be designed to directly 
conduct law enforcement activities, Rangers could be tasked 
to support particular high-risk missions or to assist law 
enforcement in dealing with criminal organizations that 
exceed the local constabulary’s capacity to handle. 
While building social capital and national identity may 
not be direct functions of government, both remain 
important.  Again, drawing on Gregg, the primary pillars of 
strengthening a state are security, economics, governance, 
and justice, with building social capital and national 
identity the two supporting pillars.74  Jennifer Widner 
describes social capital as a pentagon.  The sides of her 
pentagon are composed of trust, willingness to cooperate to 
                     
74  Gregg, "Beyond Population Engagement." 
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solve common problems, pre-disposition to participate, 
feeling better-off, and optimism.75  Although developing 
social capital would not be a direct mission for either the 
Rangers or the Civic Action units, their operations would 
strengthen each side of Widner’s pentagon. 
Developing a national identity in failed states would 
likely be more difficult, and especially in the DRC where 
lingering associations with President Mobutu’s efforts at 
“Zairianization” from 1973 into the 1990s are negative.76  
Perhaps national identity in the DRC cannot be pro-actively 
built, but instead will indirectly emerge as a result of the 
local actions of the Rangers and Civic Action units that 
would comprise the DRC’s new SOF.  This is especially likely 
if the SOF Groups draw from a mix of ethnicities and 
localities via mixage and brassage.  Then, the general 
perception of Congolese helping Congolese could eventually 
prevail over the older in-group/out-group rivalries.   
                     
75  Jennifer A. Widner, "Building Effective Trust in the Aftermath of 
Severe Conflict," in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. 
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IV. WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF STATE 
PENETRATION—CONDUCTING SOVEREIGNTY OPERATIONS IN 
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 
The current U.S. concept of the “whole-of-government” 
approach to foreign assistance seems to be designed on the 
assumption that the way the U.S. conceives of its division 
of labor and responsibilities corresponds to the division of 
labor in Partner Nations.  When and if the functions of 
government in the Partner Nation correspond to those of the 
United States at the national level—the assumption seems to 
continue—then the functions of government must be similarly 
divided at the local level, just as they are in the U.S.  
However, as evidenced in the DRC, authority at the local 
level in failed states is hardly neatly separated between 
security and administrative functions or powers.77  
Consequently, what on-the-ground realities suggest is that 
if there is minimal state penetration in under-governed 
spaces, development projects that count on the separation of 
function, with security, economics, governance, and rule of 
law neatly delineated, are not just misguided, but will not 
succeed. 
A. EMPLOYING THE OPERATIONAL GROUPS 
1. Key Functions of the Operational Groups 
The Operational Groups envisioned in this thesis would 
plan and conduct operations and development projects with 
three broad aims.  First is to expand and improve security 
                     
77  Prunier, Africa's World War, 320. 
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and governance.  Second is to develop local capacity and 
thereby build human capital.  Third is to understand the 
operational environment, a never-ending, iterative task that 
links the Operational Groups to each other and to the 
broader SOF enterprise.  
Both the Ranger and Civic Action units would help 
expand and improve security and governance.  Examples of how 
they would do so include: security and reconnaissance 
patrolling by the Rangers, crop rotation planning, road 
improvements, sanitation projects, and operation of a 
medical clinic by the Civic Action units.   
The more security, and the more confidence locals have 
in their constabulary under the tutelage of a highly 
professional SOF Group, the more likely locals will be to 
assume responsibility for projects.  As stability takes hold 
and local capacity builds, the local oil-spot would grow, 
and the resources of the Operational Group would be 
available to push sovereignty outward.  This virtuous cycle 
would, in turn, help reinforce local capacity and locals’ 
desire to assume yet more responsibility for additional 
projects. 
The third task of understanding the operational 
environment, would be both a consequence of these other 
sovereignty operations and, in turn, would provide the 
context needed to conduct ever more successful security and 
development projects.  Additionally, as local situational 
understanding builds and oil-spots grow and merge, over time 
the Operational Groups would develop a more coherent, 
comprehensive operational picture of the state. National 
identity per se might not result, but as an improved 
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understanding of the operational environment develops, 
resources could be more effectively shifted from one area to 
another, thereby demonstrating the government’s reach and 
concern. 
2. Ranger Units 
Because the Ranger units should be primarily concerned 
with supporting the twin pillars of security and justice, 
they would conduct two mutually supporting missions: 
patrolling and training.  Neither of these activities would 
be conducted in isolation; local security forces should be 
included as often as possible.  Both types of missions would 
also be conducted as frequently as possible to avoid losing 
territory to rebel forces and/or losing proficiency due to 
lack of practice. 
Patrolling beyond the current security limits would be 
the constant theme for all Ranger activities.  Considering 
the under-governed nature of the operational area, the 
objective has to be to maintain a continuous presence; after 
all, limiting the activities of rebel groups depends on a 
persistent presence throughout the operational area.  In 
support of active patrolling, the Ranger unit would also 
conduct continuous training and education.  Training and 
education would include both proficiency training and 
education of local security forces (e.g., the constabulary).  
Local forces would be incorporated into the Rangers’ 
training program so that they could conduct joint patrols 
throughout the operational area with mutual confidence. 
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One method for managing the resources and activities of 
the Ranger unit would be via the Green-Amber-Red cycle as 
shown in Figure 3.  With this method, each of the three 
Ranger platoons would be responsible for the separate tasks 
of each color phase for a specific time period.  At the end 
of the time period, the platoons would rotate 
responsibilities.  For example, a common progression would 
have a platoon in Green cycle conduct pre-mission training 
while remaining ready to respond to emergencies in the area.  
In the next phase, the platoon would move to the Amber 
cycle, also called the mission cycle, when the platoon would 
conduct patrols throughout the area.  Once the platoon had 
completed its mission cycle, it would move into Red cycle 
tasks that would include recovery and refit from patrolling, 
administrative duties, and leave and pay activities. 
 
Figure 3.   EXAMPLE GREEN-AMBER-RED CYCLE 
3. Civic Action Units 
Like the Ranger units, the Civic Action units would 
also conduct development activities and infrastructure 
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projects, as well as build up local capacity for sustaining 
these projects.  The organization of the Civic Action units 
into Agricultural, Construction, and Medical/Sanitation 
sections would facilitate the planning, coordination, and 
conduct of comprehensive, albeit basic, development 
projects.  Each section would execute projects within its 
respective area of expertise, as well as participate in 
larger projects that combine the skills and resources of 
other sections in order to meet the Group’s objectives of 
being as holistic and complete as possible. 
The training and education activities of the Civic 
Action unit would be given the same emphasis as its building 
and development of projects.  Transferring the skills of 
each section to as many citizens as possible is arguably the 
most effective way to truly develop the operational area.78  
Additionally, ensuring that locals can sustain their own 
infrastructure projects would free up the Civic Action unit 
to expand its activities beyond the initial “oil-spot.” 
Two vehicles for expanding the influence and impact of 
the Civic Action unit would be via Assessment Teams and 
Assist Teams.  The exact composition of these teams could 
well vary between Operational Groups and depend on the 
region and the situation, but the concept would remain the 
same.  The Assessment Team should consist of representatives 
from each Civic Action section and would thus be comprised 
of individuals who possess the skills to adequately assess 
the development requirements in a new area.  The Assessment 
Team would accompany Ranger patrols in order to assess the 
requirements and resources within the area of operations as 
                     
78  Natsios, "Nine Principles," 8. 
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depicted in Figure 4.  Once the team has assessed the area, 
then a more robust Civic Action Assist Team can be assembled 
to carry out the actual Civic Action work.  The Assist Team 
would be organized and resourced to accompany an extended 
Ranger patrol to the target area in order to begin the 
identified development projects and education activities, as 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
4. Sample Missions 
a. Initial Capabilities Around Base Village 
The sample mission in Figure 4 depicts a typical 
mission cycle as the immediate operational area is being 
developed.  In line with the oil-spot approach, the local 
area must be brought to a level of self-sufficiency before 
security and governance can be expanded into neighboring 
areas.  In this example, the Ranger unit patrols and the 
Civic Action unit engages in projects in order to expand 
security and governance, while the training and education 
activities of both units support developing human capital.  
Finally, all of these activities and missions contribute to 
a better understanding of the operational environment. 
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Figure 4.   EXAMPLE BASE VILLAGE MISSION 
b. Expanded Capabilities to Satellite Village 
As development projects in the local operational 
area are completed, to include training and education of 
local citizens to sustain the projects, the Operational 
Group can begin to expand sovereignty beyond the immediate 
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area.  The mission depicted in Figure 5 illustrates how an 
operational group can expand to include a neighboring 
village. 
 
Figure 5.   EXAMPLE SATELLITE VILLAGE MISSION 
5. Working Themselves Out of a Job 
While the SOF organization proposed here replicates and 
supports the functions of governance, it does so at a very 
basic level.  As the Partner Nation continues to develop and 
the state successfully penetrates under-governed areas, this 
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SOF model should become less relevant and SOF themselves may 
need to be reconfigured.  To prepare for this eventuality, 
the SOF Headquarters and School would plan for the 
transition of the SOF into a force more relevant for a 
developed nation.  One possible transition is that the 
Rangers would assume the role of Gendarmerie and support 
justice and rule of law in the spaces between local police 
jurisdictions.  Likewise, the Civic Action units could 
transition into a national Civil Service and continue to 
provide public services to the nation.  In this way, the 
soldiers that contributed to the development of sovereignty 
for their nation would continue to work toward its 
improvement.   
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTNER NATION SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCE 
Here, in somewhat more detail, is how the Partner 
Nation SOF for the DRC would be organized. 
1. Special Operations Forces Headquarters 
The SOF Headquarters, with command and control of all 
the Operational Groups, should include four functional 
divisions: command, personnel, logistics, policy and legal, 
along with a School.  These four functional divisions would 
enable the headquarters to provide resources for the 
Operational Groups, which would consist of the movement-to-
contact and civic action forces described above.  The 
express absence of an operations and plans division is 
designed to eliminate the temptation for the central 
headquarters to become directly involved with the missions 
of the Operational Groups.  As Hy Rothstein describes, many 
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operational units are, for all practical purposes, 
incapacitated by their headquarters’ operational 
“assistance.”79  Assistance in this case should be limited 
to provision of human and material resources 
The Headquarters command section should be closely 
aligned with the national government and military policy in 
order to achieve unity of effort regarding the development 
and employment of the Special Operations Forces.  However, 
the SOF command structure should not be buried under layers 
of military bureaucracy, which will only introduce 
additional objectives and tasks such as border defense or 
national counter-terrorism direct action missions.  Every 
additional task and secondary mission given to the SOF will 
only distract the unit from its primary mission to develop 
and expand sovereignty, security, and infrastructure, oil 
spot by oil spot, throughout the state’s territory. 
The Headquarter personnel and logistics sections should 
be responsible for resourcing the separate Operational 
Groups, in addition to personnel management.  While 
logistical resourcing may be straightforward, care must be 
taken that any redistribution of national resources to SOF 
does not disrupt the functioning of the rest of the military 
and/or create a political power struggle involving the new 
SOF.  Personnel management is particularly important for the 
new SOF, as will be examined in greater detail in Chapter V. 
 
                     
79  Hy Rothstein, "Less is More: the Problematic Future of Irregular 
Warfare in an Era of Collapsing States," Third World Quarterly 
(Routledge) 20, no. 2 (2007): 275–294, 281. 
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The policy and legal section should ensure that SOF 
missions are aligned with government objectives, and that 
misconduct is dealt with properly.  The specter of powerful 
leaders “going native” and megalomaniacs creating individual 
fiefdoms using “official” military power looms large in the 
memory of many people in failed and previously failed 
states.  This is particularly true of the Congo. Therefore, 
any program to develop a Special Operations Force must 
include strict legal oversight and internal prohibitions to 
dissuade the tendency of an aggressive commander from 
becoming a minor king.80 
2. Operational Groups 
The operational element for the DRC SOF would, again, 
be the Operational Group, as depicted in Figure 6.  Each 
Group would consist of a Group Headquarters, the Ranger unit 
(the movement-to-contact force), and the Civic Action unit.  
The Group will be responsible for extending law and order 
into local under-governed spaces, and developing and 
improving community infrastructure. 
a. Group Headquarters 
The Group headquarters should be divided into four 
functional sections: the command section, operations and 
intelligence, logistics, and communications.  These four 
sections will enable the Group to accomplish its objectives 
with very little need for guidance and support from any 
central authorities.  Self-sufficiency is especially 
                     
80  Prunier, Africa's World War, 73. 
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critical in failed states that lack a robust logistical 
infrastructure, which is certainly the case in the DRC. 
The Group headquarters command section should be 
closely aligned with the local civilian administration and 
develop unity of effort at the local level.  In the case of 
the Group headquarters working with the local 
administration, the unity of effort required needs to be 
cross-functional.  The Group commander and the local 
administrator need to share the same situational 
understanding of the community and have the same vision for 
what should be done to improve the situation. 
The responsibilities of the operations and 
intelligence sections of the Group headquarters would be to 
plan and coordinate the operations of the Ranger unit and 
the Civic Action unit.  The operations section would be 
responsible for interacting with the local administration to 
determine which development projects should be planned and 
prioritized, as well as identify which areas should be 
patrolled by the Ranger unit.  The operations and 
intelligence section should also develop the means and 
designate personnel to coordinate relations with all the 
local security forces within the Group’s area of 
responsibility. 
The communications section of the Group 
headquarters would develop and maintain communications with 
neighboring Groups and the SOF Headquarters.  The logistics 
section, similarly, would be responsible for acquiring and 
managing the resources required for administering the Group 
and supporting operations.  Since the Groups are designed to 
operate independently in support of the local 
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administration, it is vital that each of the sections just 
described be fully manned and functional.  This will be a 
critical task for the central Headquarters. 
b. Ranger Units 
Because the mission of the Ranger units will be to 
extend law and order into the under-governed “bush,” they 
will need to be organized much like a U.S. infantry company, 
with a small headquarters and three platoons, but without 
indirect fire weapons like mortars.  Such an organizational 
structure should provide the unit with enough separate 
elements to have one platoon on patrol, one platoon on 
standby as reinforcement and reserve, and one platoon 
recovering and refitting from the last patrol.  Since each 
Group will conduct planning and coordination, individual 
Ranger units should not have to be distracted by that task 
and can instead focus on preparing for and executing their 
mission. 
Each Ranger platoon will itself consist of three 
squads capable of conducting short-range patrols 
independently. Each Ranger squad will be organized with a 
machine gun crew in addition to two fire teams of four 
soldiers.  The firepower provided to the platoon by a 
machine gun crew in each squad should be sufficient to 
overwhelm all but the largest militia groups. 
While it is important that the Ranger unit does 
not assume local security duties, a constant coordinating 
relationship must be developed with local security forces in 
order to permanently improve sovereignty in the Group’s area 
of responsibility.  Consequently, Ranger operations must be 
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conducted in close coordination with the local constabulary, 
for instance.  At the same time, the platoon that is on 
standby or the platoon that is recovering from its last 
patrol would be capable of providing training to community 
security forces in conjunction with its own sustainment 
training.  In this way, intelligence and lessons learned 
from both the Ranger unit and the local security forces 
would be shared.  The eventual goal would be to incorporate 
local security forces into all Ranger patrols. 
c. Civic Action Units 
The ideal Civic Action unit for the DRC would 
consist of a small headquarters for planning and logistics, 
an agriculture section, a construction section, and a 
medical/sanitation section.  Separate from the functional 
sections, the primary aim of the Civic Action headquarters 
would be to coordinate with all elements of the local 
government (such as they may be) and civil society (as 
unformed as it may be) in order to identify and plan 
projects that are both desired and supportable given the 
local environment. 
The Civic Action unit would also assist with 
education and training in agriculture, construction, and 
sanitation throughout the Group’s area of responsibility.  
As the Ranger unit secures an area, personnel from the Civic 
Action unit would move in and assess local needs and 
available resources.  With the assessment complete, an 
instructional program would be designed and implemented to 
empower the locals to improve their own quality of life and 
standard of living. 
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3. The Special Operations School 
As for SOF’s own training and education, this would 
take place in the School at SOF Headquarters.  The 
curriculum would include a full range of instruction on 
governance, and not simply instruction on the legitimate use 
of force.  The School should be capable of producing leaders 
and units that can expand law and order beyond community 
boundaries, protect and secure the local population, and 
build sustainable infrastructure. 
To prepare SOF personnel to do this, the School should 
have three departments: movement-to-contact/Ranger training, 
civic action training, and service and support.  At the same 
time, the training and development of the Partner Nation SOF 
soldiers and leaders should include the widest range of 
civil-military subjects possible.  While enlisted soldiers 
should receive the bulk of their training within their 
assigned occupational specialty—either Ranger or Civic 
Action—officers and non-commissioned officers should be 
cross-trained so that both operational elements can work 
together seamlessly in their area of responsibility. 
The U.S. conception of the civil-military division of 
labor and authority is not, and may never be, applicable in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or many other failed 
states.  Trying to impose “our” separations may not only 
fail, but can even be harmful.81  This is yet another reason 
why developing proficiency in both areas is necessary.  It 
is also important for leader progression, as will be 
discussed in the next section. 
                     
81  Bacevich, et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars, 11. 
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The Ranger training group would instruct on individual 
soldier skills, small unit tactics, and professional ethics.  
The soldier skills and small unit tactics outlined in the 
U.S. Army Ranger Handbook and light infantry texts are ideal 
for movement-to-contact patrols.  Instruction in 
professional ethics, however, must be drawn from other 
sources as this is not a part of U.S. Ranger School 
training, but is nevertheless vital for creating a military 
unit that will protect and not prey on the local 
population.82 
Because the three broad categories of infrastructure 
development should be agriculture, construction, and 
medical/sanitation, the civic action unit training group 
would need to offer instruction in these areas as well as 
how to locally plan and locally sustain projects designed to 
noticeably improve a community’s quality of life.  
Instruction in civil administration is also critical for 
providing the local administration with the skills and 
resources necessary for rebuilding the state.83  U.S. 
programs in Africa in the past have often focused on U.S.-
executed projects.84  The civic action training group would 
be designed to empower the DRC’s SOF to accomplish this 
without U.S. involvement. 
 
                     
82 Bacevich, et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars, 25. 
83  The United States Institute of Peace, Guiding Principles for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington: United States Institure of 
Peace Press, 2009), 3–13. 
84  Anna Simons and Pat Colloton, "Anthropology and Irregular Warfare 
Case Study: Somalia" (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 
July 2007), 21. 
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The School’s service and support group, meanwhile, 
should be responsible for range control, training resource 
management, and assessment and selection.  This group would 
be responsible for resourcing the daily activities of both 
training groups.  For much the same reason that the SOF 
headquarters should not be subordinate to other military 
commands, the School’s training resources should be 
separated from general military supplies. 
4. Leadership Development 
a. Guest Instructor Rotation 
A key component of leadership development 
envisioned here is that leaders at every level would rotate 
back to the SOF Headquarters and School periodically for a 
tour as guest instructors.  The primary purpose for this 
would be to incorporate lessons learned from the field into 
the curriculum.  Additional benefits would come from 
circulating senior instructors back through the operational 
units.  Finally, this type of rotation would help prevent 
the development of local fiefdoms and corruption. 
The rotational assignments at the School should 
last at least one year.  As an example, say Lieutenant 
Patrice started his SOF career as a Ranger platoon leader.  
After his first tour was complete, he would return to the 
School for additional Civic Action training.  Now a senior 
Lieutenant or Captain, Patrice would next serve in a Civic 
Action unit in a different area.  After a year with the 
Civic Action unit, Captain Patrice would then rotate back to 
the Ranger unit in his same Group, and serve as either a 
staff member or commander.  After completing his assignment 
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with the Rangers, Captain Patrice would return to the School 
as a guest instructor.  In the classroom, Captain Patrice 
would be able to impart his lessons learned to future SOF 
leaders and ensure that only the best-prepared people are 
being assigned to the field while he prepares for promotion 
and, possibly, rotation back to the Group as its Commander. 
b. Training and Duty Requirements for 
Assignment and Advancement 
Officers should be required to receive training in 
both the military and civic action groups before they are 
eligible for selection as Operational Group commanders.  As 
discussed previously, SOF officers must be familiar with the 
full range of government responsibilities necessary to 
develop sovereignty.  Likewise, non-commissioned officers 
from both Ranger and Civic Action units should receive 
cross-training in order to progress to senior ranks.  Non-
commissioned officers should also be utilized as guest 
instructors and/or primary trainers at the School. 
Promotion and progression for officers should be 
tied to satisfactory performance in each component of the 
force.  In order to advance to Group command, officers, and 
senior non-commissioned officers alike should have to serve 
successfully in the Rangers, the Civic Action unit, and as 
instructors.  This will prevent individual Groups from 
becoming too heavily focused on only one method of expanding 
the “oil spot.”  Promoting the rule of law, protecting the 
local population, and improving the community’s quality of 
life, requires deft security on the one hand, and a civic 
action sensibility on the other.  Both are equally important 






Figure 6.   PARTNER NATION SOF ORGANIZATION CHART 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM 
A. UNITY OF VISION, THE SOF CAMPAIGN PLAN, AND THE 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENT 
The key to successfully developing and employing the 
Partner Nation Special Operations Force (SOF), described 
thus far, is unity of vision.  Unity of vision is described 
by Anna Simons as the ability of certain leaders to “see the 
forest and the trees.”85  While Simons’ focus is on finding 
the right “whom” to command,86 I want to suggest that a 
proper, complete operational concept and supporting 
organizational structure is not only helpful to a visionary 
leader, but can elevate a merely competent one. 
1. The SOF Campaign Plan 
The first stepping-stone to unity of vision is a clear, 
complete operational concept.  Clear objectives and goals 
are important for any military mission, but they become 
critical when developing a long-range program for failed 
states like the DRC.  For example, some critiques of U.S. 
military operations in both Afghanistan and Vietnam have 
pointed to the constant rotation of U.S. leadership as a 
major flaw in U.S. campaign methodology.  Without an 
overarching concept to guide supporting operations, the 
United States did not fight one conflict for several years, 
                     
85  Anna Simons, "Unity of Vision: What it is and Why it Matters," in 
Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society Biennial Conference 
(Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 2. 
86  Simons, "Unity of Vision," 3. 
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but re-fought the same conflict year after year.87  
Additionally, the impact of a lack of unity of vision can be 
seen in recent analyses of U.S. efforts in Somalia and 
throughout the Horn of Africa.  Simons suggests that when 
there is no unity of vision and no unified concept that 
keeps the objective and the operations aligned, the program 
is doomed.88   
The program proposed here to develop a Partner Nation 
Special Operations Force in the DRC should be conducted 
under an overarching campaign plan.  A campaign plan is 
defined in the Training and Doctrine Command publication 
525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, as 
a “broad and conceptual” plan that extends through the end 
of the campaign.89  In this case, the end may not come until 
all organized “rebel” groups within the Congo territory are 
neutralized.  Additionally, campaign design is described in 
Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, as necessary to 
“achieve a greater understanding [of the operational 
environment], a proposed solution based on that 
understanding, and a means to learn and adapt.”90 
According to Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign 
Design, the campaign plan must consider the “requirements 
for reframing” the problem.91  As security conditions change 
and the Partner Nation force becomes more proficient and 
                     
87  Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 
310. 
88  Simons and Colloton, "Anthropology and Irregular Warfare,” 25. 
89  United States Army, Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design 
(Fort Monroe: Training and Doctrine Command, 2008), 31. 
90  United States Army, Counterinsurgency (2006), 4-1. 
91  United States Army, Commander’s Appreciation, 28. 
 55
professional, the U.S. campaign plan should provide an 
analytical framework that is flexible enough that the 
operational environment can be reassessed, but rigid enough 
to prevent future operations from straying away from 
missions that support Partner Nation sovereignty.  
Accordingly, the goal of the SOF campaign should not be to 
simply prevent or counter Violent Extremist Organizations, 
but to support Partner Nation sovereignty.  Without a 
campaign plan to direct the activities and efforts of each 
training and advisory team, the program would likely fall 
victim to advisors’ personal preferences as well as to 
secondary objectives on the part of the force-providing 
headquarters. 
Ideally, the campaign plan should be designed so that 
each U.S. advisory element assigned to the mission would be 
able to continue the mission and effectively move the 
program forward, no matter when a unit or team enters the 
field.  Likewise, a SOF campaign plan should ensure that 
each subordinate program and separate U.S. deployment will 
be mutually supporting and will contribute to the whole.  
Equally important, the campaign plan should look beyond just 
the country in question—in this case, the DRC.  An important 
challenge in failed states is a lack of control over borders 
and an inability to react appropriately to external 
interference.92 As should be more than evident from the DRC 
example, something more is needed than just limited, time-
constrained operational plans developed by successively 
deployed training teams.  A comprehensive campaign plan has 
to be designed to coordinate the various U.S. efforts 
                     
92  Angel Rabasa, et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and 
Reducing Terrorism Risks (Santa Monica: Rand, 2007), 12–13. 
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through time and across space, to include taking into 
account factors beyond the DRC’s borders. 
2. The Special Operations Command and Control 
Element 
The organizational stepping-stone for ensuring that 
there is unity of vision is to establish a sub-regional 
Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) 
separate from the embassy Military Group (MILGROUP) of the 
key Partner Nation—much as U.S. Special Forces has done with 
the Special Operations Command (Forward) in Colombia.  As 
the keeper of the SOF campaign plan, a SOCCE would provide 
the persistent focus required to successfully develop and 
employ the Partner Nation Special Operations Force.  With 
oversight for the sub-region, to include the Partner Nation 
and its neighbors, and with the authorization to direct all 
U.S. SOF programs in its Area of Responsibility (AOR), such 
a SOCCE could ensure that all U.S. SOF activities support 
the SOF campaign plan.  Also, a SOCCE could help deflect 
additional tasks and competing priorities that might 
otherwise be assigned and would distract the U.S. training 
team from its carefully tailored SOF campaign plan. 
The alternative option of assigning a SOF Liaison 
Element (SOFLE) to the current MILGROUP with the task of 
overseeing the SOF program may not be sufficient to 
orchestrate and oversee such a long-term mission.  By its 
very nature, a liaison element is not normally authorized to 
command and control the actions of any U.S. forces within 
the area.  A liaison would be able to facilitate command and 
control from the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) 
to the operational element and assist with military-to-
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military communications.  However, liaisons often have 
limited capacity to advise, and have virtually no command 
authority. 
Along the same lines, a SOFLE or Joint Planning and 
Advisory Team (JPAT), typically deployed to support a 
particular country or program, is not usually able to 
adequately coordinate with U.S. forces or programs in 
neighboring countries.  Consequently, neither of these 
entities would be sufficient to maintain the Partner Nation 
SOF development program outlined here.  The dual realities 
of spillover ethnic groups and porous borders, as well as 
the long-term nature of what will be required to bolster 
sovereignty and shrink under-governed spaces, necessitates a 
supervisory element with the authority to ensure that each 
successive SOF deployment supports the SOF campaign plan.  A 
SOCCE could provide both the oversight and protection needed 
to achieve this. 
3. The Proper Role for U.S. Advisors and Trainers 
If the aim is to strengthen the Partner Nation’s 
sovereignty, U.S. forces cannot assume the role or 
responsibility of being the primary trainers for the Partner 
Nation forces.  If U.S. troops become the primary trainers 
for the program, the Partner Nation will develop neither the 
means nor the will to assume that responsibility itself 
later on.  Consequently, this will further undermine the 
state’s legitimacy, as the new force will be all too easy to 
caricature as a proxy force of the United States, and not 
one whose primary mission is to look after the local 
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population.93  Along these lines, it is important to bear in 
mind how Edward Lansdale initially conceived of civic 
action: as something the Partner Nation’s own forces need to 
do to convince the citizenry that their security forces are 
protectors and not predators.94 This understanding is echoed 
in Simons’ critique of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of 
Africa’s undertaking of infrastructure development tasks 
instead of empowering the local administration to accomplish 
those tasks.95 
The 2009 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force 
Assistance, outlines five phases of assisting a Foreign 
Security Force (FSF).  These phases are: (1) Plan and 
Prepare, (2) Generate, (3) Employ, (4) Transition, and (5) 
Sustain.96 Following this sequence, the training requirement 
for U.S. personnel would likely be greatest during the 
Generation phase, but only until the initial Partner Nation 
cadre is trained.  As the Partner Nation cadre is given 
responsibility for training and preparing new soldiers, U.S. 
personnel could shift into advisory roles with less direct 
participation in training.  My own experiences with the 
Afghan Commando program in Kabul suggest that this offers an 
excellent example of how shifting responsibility from U.S. 
trainers to Partner Nation trainers can strengthen the 
program and encourage Partner Nation ownership of the new 
SOF. 
                     
93  Ghani, et al., Closing the Sovereignty Gap. 
94  Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 70–71. 
95  Simons and Colloton, "Anthropology and Irregular Warfare,” 21. 
96  United States Army, Security Force Assistance (Washington: 
Department of the Army, 2009), 2–11. 
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The need for a relatively large number of U.S. advisors 
and trainers in this first phase could be met through a 
short-term deployment of a larger U.S. SOF element such as a 
Special Forces company, which consists of six Operational 
Detachments—Alpha (ODA) and a company headquarters.  Each 
ODA could be tasked separately to establish a specific 
component of the Headquarters and School while other ODAs 
train and prepare the initial Partner Nation instructors and 
cadre.  Once the foundation for the Partner Nation SOF is 
laid, smaller subsequent deployments of U.S. forces can 
advise and supervise the Headquarters and School operations. 
The Security Force Assistance manual also clearly 
distinguishes between advising and partnering with Partner 
Nation forces.  Whereas advising is defined as building a 
relationship to influence the advisee, partnering is defined 
as combining training and operations with U.S. and Partner 
Nation forces to influence Partner Nation forces.97  Given 
the potential high risk and low yield of U.S. forces 
operating in a failed state like the DRC, U.S. forces should 
not lead or direct Partner Nation Operational Groups.  Once 
the Partner Nation SOF has created sufficient security with 
its Operational Groups, U.S. SOF can then re-evaluate the 
costs, risks, and benefits of partner operations. 
B. RECRUITMENT, ASSESSMENT, AND SELECTION 
Recruitment for the Partner Nation SOF is a critical 
first step in setting up this program for success.  Security 
Force Assistance suggests that proper recruitment of 
minority and disaffected tribal and ethnic groups can 
                     
97  United States Army, Security Force Assistance (2009), 2-9. 
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bolster the legitimacy of the Partner Nation SOF and 
strengthen relations between minority groups and with the 
Partner Nation government.98  This is particularly important 
in states that have a history of using elite military forces 
as the personal militia of the ruling tribe or family; the 
Partner Nation SOF must not be seen as the strong arm of a 
particular political or ethnic group.99 
Multi-ethnic recruiting, along with mixage and 
brassage, could have additional benefits for failed states, 
such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by helping to 
create a national civic identity.  The deployment of the 
Operational Groups as described above should lead to 
positive experiences between members of local communities 
and members of other regions and tribes.  The positive 
relations built by the Operational Groups could begin 
several virtuous cycles.  Among them, improving the image of 
the SOF program should attract better recruits, which, in 
turn, should improve the capabilities of the Operational 
Groups.  Over time, this could even help support the 
evolution of the Civic Action units into a Civil Service 
organization. 
From a practical standpoint, recruiting to create a 
blended national SOF would also mean the Operational Groups 
should be operationally viable no matter where in the 
country they might be sent.  Much emphasis has been placed 
on the need to understand the family, ethnic, tribal, and 
religious factors that define an operational area in long-
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term operations.100  By recruiting countrywide, across all 
segments of society, the SOF Headquarters and School would 
be able to conduct cross-training of and by personnel from 
each segment so that soldiers would not have to be posted to 
their home area to ensure they have the right sensibilities. 
Personnel selection for the movement-to-contact and 
civic action forces should be conducted along the lines of 
U.S. Special Operations Forces.  Because we are talking 
about a SOF, personnel selection should be given the highest 
priority.  As noted by the Office of Strategic Services 
during the World War II pioneering days of creating a 
Special Operations Force, assessment cannot be conducted on 
the basis of whether people can accomplish a particular 
task, but instead has to focus on whether they have the 
right general characteristics.101  Finding people with the 
right “dispositions, qualities, and abilities” must take 
priority over specific military experience and should 
therefore widen the potential recruiting pool beyond those 
currently serving in the military.102 
Initially, the selection of operational personnel 
should be conducted under close objective oversight in order 
to prevent favoritism and internal rivalries from crippling 
the unit from within.  The fact that this would be a new 
U.S.-backed program could lead some to use it—or assume it 
will be used—as another path to power and status by some 
members of the Partner Nation military and by political 
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elites.  At the same time, if selection became a tool—or was 
perceived to be a tool—for the acquisition and/or retention 
of political power, the entire organization could be at risk 
of being subverted for other purposes.  Finally, the reverse 
could occur, and those in power might view it as posing a 
potential threat to their regime. 
Based on my experiences in Afghanistan, the Afghan 
Commando program again offers an excellent example of how to 
build a Partner Nation SOF training capacity, and could be 
used as a model for the proposed program in the DRC.  
Following the Afghanistan example, the initial pool of 
recruits would be locally isolated from the rest of the 
Partner Nation’s military for Assessment and Selection into 
the program.  Those who are selected for operations would 
then continue directly on to training in their respective 
specialty.  Those who are not selected should be given the 
option to either remain with the SOF in a supporting 
capacity or return to their previous position. 
Likewise, the training for the initial group could be 
done outside the DRC, at, for instance, the National 
Counter-Terrorism Center in Nairobi, Kenya, much as the 
Afghan cadre was initially trained in Jordan.  In addition 
to providing an area where the initial cadre can be fully 
trained and readied without interference, this training 
arrangement would help build relations for future regional 
coordination and assistance.  Because Kenya is also a key 
Partner Nation for Special Operations Command—Africa, this 
training arrangement would expose members of the new SOF to 
another African country’s more mature organization and its 
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methods of operations.  As with the Afghan Commando example, 
the original group would then return to the DRC as the 
initial cadre for the Headquarters and School. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER FAILED 
STATES 
The Partner Nation SOF program outlined in this thesis 
would enable developing states to increase and improve state 
penetration into under-governed areas.  The low-cost 
approach of building and deploying small, networked, self-
sufficient Operational Groups would be particularly 
effective in countries like the DRC where there is very 
little functional infrastructure.  Even better, instead of 
consuming the costly resources demanded by a typical 
national counter-terrorist unit, such a SOF would actually 
help generate the human and social capital that would 
facilitate the spread of other government functions. 
While the thesis has concentrated on the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, certain concepts described here could 
easily be exported and applied to other current or future 
programs elsewhere.  The first transferable concept is 
limited U.S. involvement.  Many of the challenges presented 
by cross-cultural misunderstanding and the frictions it 
generates would be avoided if U.S. troops did not begin to 
assume the duties and responsibilities of effecting Partner 
Nation security and governance.  Additionally, limiting 
direct U.S. involvement, and subsequently lowering costs, 
would allow an advisory program to be sustained long enough 
for it to achieve lasting improvement.  Following from 
limited U.S. involvement, Partner Nation personnel should be 
trained and prepared to take responsibility for every aspect 
of their SOF from the beginning of the program—from 
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selection to training to employment.  Otherwise, the Partner 
Nation SOF will always be dependent on U.S. participation or 
support in one fashion or another. 
Also, by focusing on establishing the functions of 
governance instead of the bureaucracy of government, this 
program would enhance the responsiveness and legitimacy of 
the Partner Nation.  The development programs of the Partner 
Nation SOF must be based on an analysis of local 
requirements and not on preferences in its capital or ours.  
If the projects are not relevant to local conditions, and 
not locally sustainable, then even the most “productive” 
Partner Nation SOF will fail to expand good governance and 
sovereignty.  At the same time, simply assessing needs 
accurately is not sufficient.  The Partner Nation SOF has to 
be organized in such a way as to assist locals to address 
them.  Sustainability cannot be accomplished in any other 
way. 
Finally, the security to be achieved via this model 
marries Wendt’s operational model, the oil-spot 
counterinsurgency approach, and Arquilla’s “New Rules of 
War.”  By deploying the Operational Groups as a dispersed 
network of sorts, the Ranger units would be able to find and 
then swarm against security threats.  Also, as each Group’s 
oil-spot expands so would its understanding of the 
operational environment.  With improved situational 
understanding, its ability to respond to local requirements 
would only become more efficient and effective. 
While the DRC presents what many might consider to be a 
worst-case scenario, many of the specific challenges faced 
in the Congo mirror those in other failed states and under-
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governed spaces.  In keeping with the emphasis on the 
significance of local conditions and the importance of 
understanding the local operational environment, clearly any 
application of this model would have to be informed by 
detailed study of the particular Partner Nation in question, 
and its region.  However, the tenets of this model should 
have broad applicability elsewhere, and with so many fragile 
states from which to (unfortunately) choose, it should not 
be difficult to launch a pilot program somewhere, if not in 
the DRC itself. 
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